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Abstract
Contracts play an important role in business where relationships among different parties
are dictated by legal rules. The notion of electronic contracts has emerged mostly due to
technological advances and the electronic trading among companies and customers. Thereby
new challenges have arisen to guarantee reliability among the stakeholders in electronic ne-
gotiations. In this scenery, the automatic verification of electronic contracts appeared as the
solution but as a new challenge at the same time. An important task on verifying contracts
is concerned of detecting conflicts in multi-party contracts. The problem of checking contracts
has been largely addressed in the literature, but we are not aware about any method and tool
that deals with multi-party contracts and conflict detection using a contract language. This
work presents an automatic checker, so-called RECALL, for finding conflicts on multi-party
contracts modeled by an extension of a contract language. We developed an automatic checking
tool and also applied it to a a well-known case study of selling products that is characterized
by multi-party aspects of the contracts. We also performed some experiments in order to show
the tool performance w.r.t. the size of contracts.
1 Introduction
Business relationships have become increasingly more customary among companies and customers
thanks to technological advances. In this setting new challenges have arisen on business negotiations
seeing that interrelationships among the stakeholders are liable to disagreements. To overcome
potential disagreements transaction rules have been introduced to avoid conflict situations based
on the notion of legal contracts.
Contracts are composed by clauses that describe business rules in a setting with several involved
parties. Then, obligations, prohibitions, and permissions can be enforced by rules which express
rights and duties over the parties of a contract. A contract can be, in general, classified in three
groups: unilateral contracts, when only a single party assumes responsibilities; bilateral contracts,
when responsibilities are upon two involved parties; and multilateral, or multi-party contracts, when
several parties assume responsibilities [1].
Conflicts may arise in a contract when two or more parties are involved by associated rules,
especially for multi-party contracts, where several parties are simultaneously related to each other.
An ambiguous description of a contract, e.g. given in natural language, may result in inconsistent
relationships. Problems of this nature can be avoided or mitigated when contracts are more ac-
curately described by formalisms. A precise description of contracts guarantees more reliability in
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their interpretations. However, even making use of formalisms inconsistencies and ambiguities can
be introduced in a contract specification. Therefore an automatic verification of contracts specified
by an appropriate formalism is desirable to avoid conflicts.
Formal verification of electronic contracts have been largely studied in the literature [5, 12, 19,
23]. Some approaches were proposed to either guarantee certain properties on the contracts or
detect undesired situations, such as deadlocks, and unnecessary or conflicting clauses. Conflicts are
characterized by contradictory clauses which, in turn, can incur in incoherent rules of a contract.
Hence it is desirable that a conflict may be detected and solved in a contract negotiation process
before running the contract in practice.
In this work we treat a more complex class of contracts, so-called multi-party contracts which
are specified by an extended contract language. The classical Contract Language (CL) has been
proposed by Prisacariu [20] to comprise concepts of the relativized deontic logic [10] and the dynamic
logic [8] to specify multi-party contracts. We then propose a conflict detection method for multi-
party contracts modeled by this extended contract language, named Relativized Contract Language
(RCL) [4]. Our method allows for more complex contracts where parties’ relationships and their
designations are deemed important. The method has been developed and named by RelativizEd
ContrAct Language anaLyser (RECALL)1. We also model and check a real-world case study by
using the RECALL tool. The presented case study aims in twofold: first, it provides a proof of
concept on the RECALL’s functionalities; and secondly, it allow us to check a well-known problem
in the literature. We further describe some practical experiments to evaluate the efficiency and
effectiveness of our tool. We randomly generate different groups of multi-party contracts where each
experiment evaluates aspects related to scalability, processing time, and resource consumption.
The remaining of this paper is organized as follows. We survey some works that are more closely
related to the conflict detection problem for multi-party contracts in Section 2. In Section 3 we
motivate our work introducing a real case study for a sales contract. We give the foundations of our
proposed method in Section 4. Section 5 presents the RECALL tool and its practical application
over the real case study based on trading rules modeled and checked using RCL. In Section 6
some experimental results are presented to evaluated the proposal. Section 7 gives some concluding
remarks and future directions.
2 Related work
Multi-party contracts are defined by agreements signed by several stakeholders in a business deal.
A contract of this nature cannot be decomposed within a set of bilateral contracts, where the
arrangements are firmed by stakeholders in pairs, without loss of information [23]. Therefore multi-
party contracts are, in fact, more complex to be modeled and verified because they require suitable
formalisms to appropriately express manifold relationships and particular identifications. According
to Fenech et al. [5], particular responsibilities cannot be placed in a bilateral contract modeled by
CL [18].
By contrast, Herrestad and Krogh [10] have proposed an extension of the standard deontic
logic [11], so-called relativized deontic logic, to identify stakeholders in relationships. The rela-
tivized deontic logic personifies deontic operators, allowing for more complex scenarios when several
parties are simultaneously involved in a deal. Unfortunately, a formalism to precisely deal with the
remaining aspects of CL, aside from the standard deontic logic, is lacking.
1Available on http://recallcontracts.github.io
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Fenech et al. [5] then proposed a conflict detection method for bilateral contracts based on CL.
Thus we extend their classical mechanism to support the analysis of multi-party contracts. First,
we extend the CL contract representation and then we propose a conflict detection algorithm for
the extension.
We represent our contribution and its relation with logics, languages, and techniques proposed
in the literature by the scheme depicted in Figure 1. The rounded rectangles and dashed arrows
indicate our contributions.
Deontic Logic
CL
Dynamic Logic
CL conflict detectionRelativized
Deontic Logic
RCL Multi-party conflict detection
using
using
Figure 1: Scheme of our contribution.
3 A Real-world Multi-party Contract
In this section we start with the real-world case study that motivates our work and also supports
the proof of concept in the tool testing. The case study looks into a well-known business model of
selling products [2]. In the following subsections we, first, describe the electronic sales contract and
in the sequel present multi-party aspects that characterize it.
3.1 The Sales Contract
Electronic transactions have become a fairly common practice. Although there are several con-
sumer protection laws, barely formulated agreements can remain on a contract in such a way that
frauds and misunderstandings may still arise among the stakeholders. Electronic commerce become
more complex when its business model contains interdependencies among the participating parties.
Interdependencies are, in fact, necessary to precisely express the complexity of a certain contract.
For instance, in a bilateral sales contract we cannot guarantee that the seller and the buyer
comply with the agreement upon the payment and the delivery of the traded product. On the one
hand, the seller cannot deliver the product to the buyer before the latter has paid it. In this case,
the seller is unprotected once the buyer in turn does not pay the product and the former is harmed.
On the other hand, if the buyer pays for the product before receiving it, then the seller might not
deliver the product and the agreement comes to a violation. In any case both are unprotected and
the contract can be violated either due to the lack of payment or not receiving the goods.
Financial agencies are then used to intermediate payments in a electronic commerce, and thus
avoiding contractual breaches. In the present case study, financial transactions are intermediated
by a bank to which payments are accomplished by a buyer but the amount is transfered to the
seller only after the respective product is delivered to the buyer. Thus we guarantee that a buyer is
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not harmed since the bank can reimburse him if the product is not delivered. In addition, internal
rules and specific regulations of the involved parties can also be included in a contract.
Next we present all arrangements and rules of the sales contract. The stakeholders in the
case study are: buyer, seller, bank and shipping company. A buyer buys a product from a seller,
the shipping company (or carrier) is in charge to deliver the product to the buyer, and the bank
intermediates all financial transactions. Besides the agreements we need to take into account internal
rules of the stakeholders. For instance, the carrier need not to deliver an order while the shipping
cost has not been paid by the seller. In addition payments are accomplished by the bank only
after it receives an appropriate notification in order to prevent frauds. Now we fully describe the
contract:
[Sales Contract]
1. Buyer performs the purchase of a product from the Seller.
2. Buyer is obliged to pay the product to the Bank.
3. Bank must send the notification about product’s payment to Seller.
4. After Bank notifies the Seller about the payment, Seller is obliged to send the product by means of Carrier
and pays the product’s shipping costs to the Bank.
5. Carrier must deliver the product to Buyer.
6. After the product is delivered, Buyer is obliged to acknowledge the Bank about the product delivery, whereas
Carrier must notify the Seller that the product was delivered to Buyer.
7. When the Seller is notified about the product delivery, the Seller is obliged to notify the Bank allowing the
payment of the shipping costs to the Carrier.
8. When Buyer notifies the Bank that the product was received, Bank releases the payment amount to the
Seller.
9. Bank must pay the shipping costs to the Carrier after Seller makes the payment of the referred amount.
[Internal Bank Rules]
10. Bank is prohibited to pay Seller till it has received a proper notification from Buyer confirming the product
delivery.
11. Bank is prohibited to release the payment of shipping costs for the Carrier till Seller notifies the bank.
[Internal Carrier Rules]
12. Carrier is prohibited to deliver the product till Seller has paid the shipping costs.
To easy the reference and to keep the notation uncluttered we define some symbols and key words
for the contract. The stakeholders are also called by individuals and we refer them by symbols as
defined in Table 1. Similarly, actions related to the contract are given in Table 2.
3.2 Multi-party Aspects of the Contract
Bilateral contracts are not able to establish multi-party relationships composed by more than two
individuals [24]. Hence a multi-party contract cannot be broken down into a set of bilateral contracts
without loss of information. In this section we have no intention to formally prove such property,
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Individual Symbol
buyer b
seller s
bank k
carrier c
Table 1: List of individuals.
Action Description
buyProduct Buy a product
payProduct Pay the product
notifyProductPayment Notify the product payment
sendProduct Send the product
deliverProduct Deliver the product
notifyProductReceipt Notify the product receipt
notifyProductDelivery Notify the product delivery
payShippingCosts Pay the shipping costs
releaseShippingCosts Release the shipping costs
Table 2: List of actions
provided that other works have studied it [9,23]. Instead we aim at showing that the sales contract is,
in fact, characterized by multi-party aspects. Therefore we make use of Petri Net models [14,17,21]
to specify the sales contract. Petri Net is a well-known formalism that can appropriately describe
distributed systems which, in turn, is characterized by different components communicating to
coordinate to each other in whole system.
A basic Petri Net model is defined by a collection of directed arcs connecting places and tran-
sitions. Places may hold tokens which represent the state or marking of a net according to its
assignment by tokens to places. Arcs can only connect places to transitions and have capacity one
by default. Otherwise the capacity must be explicitly marked on the arc. A transition is enabled
when the number of tokens in each of its input places is at least equal to the arc weight going from
the place to the transition. Tokens of input places are moved to output places when an enabled
transition is fired according to arc weights. After the transition firing, a new marking of the net is
obtained as the result, a state description of all places.
The Petri Net model for the sales contract is depicted in Figure 2. The specification basically
follows the previous Sales Contract description. The resulting model is composed by eleven places,
p1 . . . p11, nine transitions, t1 . . . t9, and has one token marked at place p1 to start the execution.
This token at place p1 enables transition t1 that can be fired at any time. When the buyer performs
the purchase transition t1 fires and produces one token at place p2. It means that transition t2 is
enabled to fire, i.e. buyer can pay the product. When t2 is fired one token is produced at places p3
and p4. It means that the buyer is waiting for the product (place p3) and the payment was received
by the bank (place p4).
Note that the marked token at place p3 is not enough to enable transition t6 because its pre-
condition (arc from p3 to t6) is weighted by two tokens. However transition t3 is enabled by p4 and
when it is fired the bank notifies the seller about the payment, producing one token at place p5. It
represents that the seller must send the product by means of the carrier and also must pay the ship-
ping costs. When both conditions are satisfied transition t4 is then fired and one token is produced
in each place, p6 and p7. Place p6 reflects that although the bank holds the shipping costs, the
carrier cannot be payed yet (transition t8), unless the product is delivered to the buyer (transition
t7). But place p7 denotes the product is already in tenure of the carrier and enables transition t5.
The product is effectively delivered to the buyer when transition t5 is fired and another token is
produced at place p3.
At this point place p3 has two tokens and it enables transition t6. After transition t6 is fired
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t7
p10
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Figure 2: Petri net for the sales contract.
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one token is produced at place p8, and another one is produced at place p9. The latter says the
bank is notified by the buyer as concerning the product receipt, and the former says the carrier has
notified the seller about the delivery. Hence transition t7 is enabled and after it is fired another
token is produced at place p6. Now place p6 enables transition t8 and when t8 is fired the carrier
receives the shipping costs. The payment is represented by the token produced at place p10. On
the other hand, that token produced at place p8 enables transition t9 which means that the bank
can release the payment to the seller. After t9 is fired one token is produced at place p11 meaning
that the seller has received the payment. The final marking of the net with one token at place p10
and another token at place p11 means the trading is already finished.
We know that different bilateral contracts cannot share information and actions which are
preconditions cannot be assured to happen simultaneously on distinct bilateral contracts. Thus
we notice that when the sales contract is modeled by separating bilateral contracts where one
individual of a subcontract is not directly related to other individual of a distinct subcontract the
expressiveness of whole business model cannot be properly captured.
It is a simple matter to see that whether we have both seller and carrier separated in two different
bilateral contracts we would have a setting where the carrier could not notify the seller about the
delivery. So one cannot guarantee that the seller would notify the bank to release the shipping costs
to the carrier which, in turn, could be harmed in the trading. We can observe this scenario in the
Petri Net model depicted in Figure 2. Had the transition t6 not been fired to produce one token at
place p9, transition t7 would not also be fired to produce the required token at place p6. Then the
transition t8 which is weighted by two would not be enabled and so place p10 would never take the
required token to denote the end of the process. Such situations render to unstable contracts since
the required relationships and preconditions cannot be properly modeled.
4 Multi-party conflict detection method
We extend the classical mechanism proposed by Fenech et al. [5] to support the analysis of multi-
party contracts. The conflict detection method comprises, basically, two steps: the construction of
an automaton to represent the contract; and the conflict detection analysis that is applied on this
automaton.
The conflict detection process for multi-party contracts also requires an appropriate formalism
to specify agreements of rights and duties under the perspective of several stakeholders. In this
case, business rules rely on specific parties of a contract, in contrast to bilateral relationships where
rights and duties are globally assumed in the whole contract. The extension proposed in this
work comprises on: extending the CL syntax to support relativization; defining a semantics for
CL operators according to new syntax; modifying the automaton construction based on the new
semantics; and adapting the conflict detection algorithm regarding the new trace semantics. Next
subsections detail each step of our method and also give part of the case study of a sales contract
as a running example. We make it clear that our work has a more practical leaning and it is not
our intention here to formally prove the correctness of the proposal.
4.1 Extension of CL syntax
Revitalizations upon deontic operators were proposed by Herrestad and Krogh [10]. Particular
individuals can be associated to deontic operators to allow individual identification when actions
are performed in a contract. Beyond the global operators, as defined in the standard deontic logic,
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relativized operators can explicitly specify senders, receivers, or both on the operators. The classical
CL is defined over the standard deontic logic and over the dynamic logic, but no relativization is
allowed by the language.
A multi-party contract can be defined by a set of clauses, which in turn, are composed by
obligations, permissions, prohibitions, and dynamic modalities over actions. Formally, let C be
a contract, where I is the set of individuals (parties) of the contract. The set of deontic modal
operators is D = {O,P, F}, where O is an obligation, P ) is a permission and F is a prohibition. The
set R = {g, i, iy j | i, j ∈ I} defines all possible relativizations, and AB is the set of basic actions,
where α ∈ AB is an action associated to the operator d, with d ∈ D. For instance, gd(α) indicates
that the action α must be performed by all individuals of C according to the deontic operator
d. On the other hand, id(α) indicates that the action α, associated to d, must be performed by
i ∈ I. Finally, iyjd(α) says that the action α associated to operator d must be performed by i and
received by j. For the sake of simplicity, we omit the symbol g, which represents a global operator.
Considering dynamic operators, g[α]C indicates that after action α is performed, a contract C takes
place. The relativized dynamic operator i[α]C denotes that C is valid if the individual i performs
α. Lastly, iyj [α]C indicates that C takes place if i performs α to j.
The RCL syntax is presented in Figure 3. A contract C can then be derived following this
C ::= CO | CP | CF | C ∧ C | CD | > |⊥
CO ::= OC(α) | iOC(α) | iyjOC(α) | CO ⊕ CO
CP ::= P (α) | iP (α) | iyjP (α) | CP ⊕ CP
CF ::= FC(α) | iFC(α) | iyjFC(α) | CF ∨ CDCF
CD ::= [β]C | i[β]C | iyj [β]C
α ::= 0 | 1 | a | α× α | α · α | α+ α
β ::= 0 | 1 | a | β × β | β · β | β + β | β | β∗
Figure 3: Relativized CL Grammar
grammar according to the conventional definitions. Penalty mechanisms, denoted by a subscript C,
can also be defined on operators of obligation and prohibition when violations occur.
We also note that actions can be composed by different operators: choice between two actions
denoted by +, concurrency between actions specified by ×, priority on actions given by ·, as well
as the special actions 0 and 1 to represent, respectively, the contract violation and the execution
of any action. A dynamic operator allows the iteration operator ∗ over an action, and the negation
of an action α, which means that any other action can be performed instead of α.
Decompositions and equivalences obtained from the grammar extension, likewise in CL, define
the semantics. Figure 4 presents some decompositions over RCL, and the equivalences follow as
proposed by Meyer [13].
For the sake of illustration we completely specify the sales contract according to the RCL Syntax
as depicted in Figure 5. For instance, see the clause described at line (10) now specified at line (19)
in RCL.
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iOC(α) ⇐⇒ i[α]C
iFC(α) ⇐⇒ i[α]C
iOC(α× β) ⇐⇒ iOC(α) ∧ iOC(β)
iOC(α · β) ⇐⇒ iOC(α) ∧ i[α] iOC(β)
iOC(α+ β) ⇐⇒ ( iOC(α) ∧ iOC(β))⊕ iOC(α)⊕ iOC(β)
iFC(α× β) ⇐⇒ iFC(α) ∧ iFC(β)
iFC(α · β) ⇐⇒ iFC(α) ∨ i[α] iFC(β)
iFC(α+ β) ⇐⇒ iFC(α) ∧ iFC(β)
iP (α× β) ⇐⇒ iP (α) ∧ iP (β)
iP (α · β) ⇐⇒ iP (α) ∧ i[α] iP (β)
iP (α+ β) ⇐⇒ iP (α) ∧ iP (β)
i[α× β]C ⇐⇒ i[α]C ∧ i[β]C
i[α · β]C ⇐⇒ i[α] i[β]C
i[α+ β]C ⇐⇒ i[α]C ∧ i[β]C
Figure 4: Decompositions of RCL
1 {b , s } [ buyProduct ] (
2 {b , k}O( payProduct ) ˆ
3 {b , k } [ payProduct ] (
4 {k , s}O( notifyProductPayment ) ˆ
5 {k , s } [ notifyProductPayment ] (
6 {s , c}O( sendProduct ) ˆ
7 {s , k}O( payShippingCosts ) ˆ
8 {s , k } [ payShippingCosts ] (
9 {s , c } [ sendProduct ] (
10 {c , b}O( de l i ve rProduct ) ˆ
11 {c , b } [ d e l i ve rProduct ] (
12 {b , k}O( not i fyProductRece ipt ) ˆ
13 {c , s}O( not i f yProductDe l ive ry ) ˆ
14 {b , k } [ not i fyProductRece ipt ] ({ k , c}O( payProduct ) ) ˆ
15 {c , s } [ no t i f yProductDe l ive ry ] (
16 {s , k}O( l i b e r a t eSh ipp ingCos t s ) ˆ
17 {s , k } [ l i b e r a t eSh ipp ingCos t s ] ({ k , c}O( payShippingCosts ) )
18 ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ;
19 {b , k } [ ( ! n o t i f y D e l i v e r y )∗ ] ({ k , s}F( payProduct ) ) ;
20 {s , k } [ ( ! l i b e r a t eSh ipp ingCos t s )∗ ] ({ k , c}F( payShippingCosts ) ) ;
21 {s , c } [ ( ! payShippingCosts )∗ ] ({ c , b}F( de l i ve rProduct ) ) ;
Figure 5: The RCL sales contract specification
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4.2 RCL semantics
We extend the trace semantics proposed by Fenech et al. [5] now upon the notion of relativization
given by Herrestad and Krogh [10]. The trace semantics on RCL is now defined by sequences of
actions, which can be relativized, that run in a contract. A trace is composed by a pair: a action
trace and a deontic trace. The action trace is composed by relativized actions putting together
information upon the action associated to an operator, as well as the involved parties. The deontic
traces are also preserved over the deontic operators with relativizations. Hence the extension allow
us to deal with relativized operators of relativized CL syntax.
Formally speaking, a relativized action is given by a tuple ar = 〈κ, χ, λ〉, where χ ∈ AB is a
basic action and κ, λ ∈ I are individuals, a sender and a receiver, respectively, associated to χ.
The set of relativized actions is then obtained by Ar = {I × AB × I}, combining basic actions
and individuals. In addition, the set of concurrent relativized actions is obtained by the power set
A2r = 2Ar , where concurrent relativized actions can be combined to each other. An action trace
is, formally, defined by σ : N → A2r, where σ gives the concurrent actions at position i ∈ N on
the trace. Let σ = α0, α1, . . . be a trace with αi ∈ A2r, i ≥ 0, we get σ(i) = αi. The length
of a trace is |σ| and the empty trace is denoted by ε. A sub-trace is written σ(i..j), where i is
the initial position and j is the final position on the trace. An infinite trace σ(i...) denotes a
sub-trace starting at position i. The concatenation of two traces σ′ and σ′′ follows the standard
definition, denoted by σ′σ′′. The union operation over two deontic traces σd ∪ σ′d is defined by
σd(0)∪σ′d(0);σd(1)∪σ′d(1); . . . ;σd(n)∪σ′d(n) with | σd |=| σ′d |. The set of deontic modalities upon
actions is given by M = { rdα | r ∈ R, d ∈ D, α ∈ AB}. Thus σd : N → 2M denotes the deontic,
where each position of σd gives a set of representation combinations of deontic modalities, with
σd(i) ∈ 2M for all i ∈ N. Representations of 2M distinguish conjunctions and disjunctions over the
deontic modalities.
To illustrate the definitions and notation, let C = iyjO(a) ∧ iyjO(b) ∧ iyjF (b) and C′ =
iyjO(a + b) ∧ iyjF (b) be contracts. The deontic traces are σd = 〈{iyjOa}, {iyjOb}, {iyjFb}〉
and σ′d = 〈{iyjOa, iyjOb}, {iyjFb}〉, respectively. In the former, we have a conflict due to the
obligation and the prohibition over the action b. In contrast, in the latter contract any conflict
can be found since the choice operator into the obligation over actions a and b does not violate the
prohibition over b.
The new trace semantics also deals with global deontic modalities, where a concurrent relativized
action denotes that the action associated to the modality must be performed by all individuals of
the contract. For instance, O(α) generates the action trace σ(0) ⊆ {〈x, α, y〉 | y ∈ I,∀x ∈ I}. If the
modality is relativized, i.e. iO(α), we get the trace σ(0) ⊆ {〈i, α, x〉 | x ∈ I}. Similarly, a directed
modality iyjO(α) produces the trace σ(0) ⊆ {〈i, α, j〉 | i, j ∈ I}.
We also redefine the satisfaction relation σ, σd |= C on the semantics of operators to determine
whether the action trace σ and the deontic trace σd satisfy the contract C. TheRCL trace semantics
is partially described in Figure 6, where C is a clause (or contract), α ∈ Ar is a relativized action
and i, j ∈ I are individuals. Formulas comprise actions that are composed by the operators of
choice, concurrency and sequence (See Subsection 4.1).
The satisfaction relation follows the rules of the classical semantics However, specific individuals
need to be checked on the trace when operators are relativized with a sender, a receiver, or both,
to satisfy the formula. In the following example, σ, σd |=iyj O(α), at least one relativized action in
σ(0) must be the action α which, in turn, must be performed by i to another individual j. Formally,
we have ∃ϕ ∈ σ(0) | ϕ = 〈i, α, j〉. A dynamic modality, σ, σd |=iyj [α]C, does not introduce deontic
information on deontic traces. Therefore one considers only the action trace in the satisfaction
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(1)σ, σd 6|= C if | σ | 6= | σd |
(2)σ, σd |= C if | σ |= 0 and | σd |= 0
(3)σ, σd |= C1 ∧ C2 if σ, σ′d |= C1 and σ, σ′′d |= C2 and σd = σ′d ∪ σ′′d
(4)σ, σd |= OC(α) if Oα ∈ σd(0) and (∀i ∈ I,∃ϕ ∈ σ(0), x ∈ I |
ϕ = 〈i, α, x〉 and σ(1 . . . ), σd(1 . . . ) |= >) or (σ(1 . . . ), σd(1 . . . ) |= C)
(5)σ, σd |= iOC(α) if iOα ∈ σd(0) and (∃ϕ ∈ σ(0), x ∈ I | ϕ = 〈i, α, x〉
and σ(1 . . . ), σd(1 . . . ) |= >) or (σ(1 . . . ), σd(1 . . . ) |= C)
(6)σ, σd |= iyjOC(α) if iyjOα ∈ σd(0) and (∃ϕ ∈ σ(0) | ϕ = 〈i, α, j〉
and σ(1 . . . ), σd(1 . . . ) |= >) or (σ(1 . . . ), σd(1 . . . ) |= C)
(7)σ, σd |= [α]C if (∀i ∈ I,∃ϕ ∈ σ(0), x ∈ I | ϕ = 〈i, α, x〉 and
σ(1 . . . ), σd(1 . . . ) |= C) or (∀i ∈ I, x ∈ I,@ϕ ∈ σ(0) | ϕ = 〈i, α, x〉)
(8)σ, σd |= i[α]C if (∃ϕ ∈ σ(0), x ∈ I | ϕ = 〈i, α, x〉 and
σ(1 . . . ), σd(1 . . . ) |= C) or (x ∈ I,@ϕ ∈ σ(0) | ϕ = 〈i, α, x〉)
(9)σ, σd |= iyj[α]C if (∃ϕ ∈ σ(0) | ϕ = 〈i, α, j〉 and
σ(1 . . . ), σd(1 . . . ) |= C) or (@ϕ ∈ σ(0) | ϕ = 〈i, α, j〉)
Figure 6: RCL semantics
verification. The remaining modalities of RCL are obtained according to the standard derivation
as described in the original CL semantics [5].
4.3 Automaton construction
To proceed with the process of detecting conflicts on a contract an automaton thats represents
it must be constructed. We adapt the classical algorithm [5] to detect conflicts on multi-party
contracts described by RCL. New deontic operators are taken into account by the algorithm and
new criteria with relativizations are considered on detecting conflicts.
We formally define an automatonA, representing a contract C, byA(C) = 〈S,A2r,M, I, s0, T, V, l, δ〉,
where S is the set of states, A2r is the set of concurrent relativized actions, M is the set of deontic
labels, I is the set of individuals, s0 is the initial state, T ⊆ S×A2r×S is the labeled transition rela-
tion, V is the violation state, l : S → C is a labeling function of states with contract decompositions,
and δ : S → 2M is a labeling function of states with deontic information from the decompositions.
A sequence of concurrent relativized actions from A2r that defines the action trace is a string of the
accepted language by the generated automaton.
The construction is given by function f : C × A2r → C and it is described by Algorithm 1.
Function f decomposes a given contract according to the relativized actions to be performed on it.
We illustrate a decomposition over a relativized dynamic operator and a relativized action ϕ ∈ A2r.
We get f(i[α]C, ϕ) = C when ∃ar ∈ ϕ | ar = 〈i, α, x〉 and i, x ∈ I. Otherwise, f(i[α]C, ϕ) = >. Note
that the complete definition of f also considers global and directed dynamic operators, deontic
operators of obligation [3], prohibition and permission as well as compound actions of dynamic
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operators according to the syntax and the decomposition rules of Subsection 4.1.
Algorithm 1: Contract automaton construction
input : State s ∈ S of A(C)
output : Automaton A(C)
begin
if searchConflicts (s) then
conflict found in state s;
else if l(s) = > then
T ← T ∪ (s,>, s);
else if l(s) = ⊥ then
V ← s;
T ← T ∪ (V,⊥, V );
else
for α ∈ A2r do
C′ ← f(l(s), α);
if ∃s′ ∈ S | l(s′) = C′ then
T ← T ∪ (s, α, s′);
else
S ← S ∪ s′;
l(s′)← C′;
T ← T ∪ (s, α, s′);
δ(s′)← fd(C′);
constructAutomaton (s′);
end
end
end
return A(C);
end
Algorithm 1 also makes use of an auxiliary function for deontic labeling. The function fd : C →
2M labels every state of the automaton after a decomposition with deontic information according to
the deontic trace σd. Given a contract, fd then returns a subset of 2
M that provides the decomposed
contract at a state with the deontic operators and their respective actions. An empty set is returned
by the function when only dynamic operators and no deontic information are presented on the
contract. Deontic information obtained by fd are at that time associated to states that represent
the decompositions obtained by function δ. The whole process stops either when a conflict is found
or if whole contract were decomposed into atomic clauses. An atomic clause of a contract is a clause
that contains only basic actions associated to deontic and dynamic operators. At this time, the
atomic clauses are evaluated to satisfaction, violation or conflict.
Note that the trace semantics is obtained according to the construction of the automaton.
States and transitions of the automaton are constructed whereas their sequences give the semantics
of traces that represents the contract as seen at line (4) in Figure 8. The corresponding automaton
of the sales contract is partially depicted in Figure 7. Each state of the automaton contains its
respective decomposition of the contract i.e., a RCL formula, and an ongoing transition to it
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represents the set of relativized actions that was applied to obtain this formula. Unfilled states
represent intermediary decompositions obtained after evaluating their respective clauses. A special
state represents a contract violation when the evaluated formula returns false. Another special state
indicates the satisfaction of the contract, where the evaluated formula is reduced to true. Finally
the last special state that is highlighted in gray at Figure 7 indicates a conflicting decomposition
as seen at line (3) on Figure 8.
S0 S2
[(b, notifyDelivery, k),
(s, payShippingCosts, c),
(b, buyProduct, s),
(s, liberateShippingCosts, k)]
S11
[(s, payShippingCosts, c),
(b, buyProduct, s),
(s, liberateShippingCosts, k)]
S20
[(b, notifyDelivery, k),
(b, buyProduct, s),
(s, liberateShippingCosts, k)]
S3[(b, payProduct, k)] S4[(k, notifyProductPayment, s)] S5
[(s, sendProduct, c),
(s, payShippingCosts, k)] S6[(s, sendProduct, c)]
[(b, payProduct, k),
(b, notifyDelivery, k)]
S12[(b, payProduct, k)]
[(k, notifyProductPayment, s),
(b, notifyDelivery, k)]
S13[(k, notifyProductPayment, s)] [(s, sendProduct, c),
(s, payShippingCosts, k),
(b, notifyDelivery, k)]
S14
[(s, sendProduct, c),
(s, payShippingCosts, k)]
[(s, sendProduct, c),
(b, notifyDelivery, k)]
S15[(s, sendProduct, c)]
[(b, payProduct, k),
(s, payShippingCosts, c)]
S21
[(b, payProduct, k)]
[(k, notifyProductPayment, s),
(s, payShippingCosts, c)]
S22[(k, notifyProductPayment, s)]
[(s, sendProduct, c),
(s, payShippingCosts, k),
(s, payShippingCosts, c)]
S23
[(s, sendProduct, c),
(s, payShippingCosts, k)]
[(s, sendProduct, c),
(s, payShippingCosts, c)]
S24[(s, sendProduct, c)]
Figure 7: Partial generated automaton of the contract
4.4 Conflict detection
Next the conflict detection process is applied according as the algorithm constructs the automaton.
The corresponding contract to a decomposition at a generated state is then checked in order to
find conflicts. Sceneries of conflicts treated by the algorithm are characterized by the occurrence
of: (1) deontic operators of obligation and prohibition on the same action; (2) deontic operators of
prohibition and permission on the same action; (3) deontic operators of obligation on pre-defined
conflicting actions; and (4) deontic operators of permission and obligation on pre-defined conflicting
actions. A pre-defined conflicting action is, in fact, characterized when actions are performed by
the same individual specified in a relativization.
In the classical approach a conflict is characterized by deontic operators occurring over the same
action. However, a conflict does not accomplish when relativized deontic operators are associated to
the same action but they are performed by distinct individuals. For instance, in the contract iO(α)∧
jF (α) where the action α is obliged and prohibited, simultaneously, a conflict is not characterized
since different individuals are associated to the operators. Similarly, an action performed under
operators of permission and prohibition at the same time, and fired by distinct individuals, will not
induce a conflict.
We note that global deontic operators are always in conflict with relativized prohibition op-
erators. A conflict can then be characterized by a global obligation together with a relativized
prohibition associated to the same action in a conjunction, e.g., ∀x ∈ I, xO(α) ∧ iF (α) or simply
O(α) ∧ iF (α). Similarly to permission and prohibition operators when at least one of them is a
global modality.
Thus the detection mechanism has been also modified to deal with for pre-defined actions in
the presence of relativizations. The conflict relation is now defined by # ⊆ Ar × Ar instead
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of the classical # ⊆ AB × AB, where α#β denotes that actions α and β can not be performed
concurrently. Thus pre-defined conflicts among relativized actions can be described in a contract.
Relativized actions are in conflict if they are performed by the same individual. We can defined a
conflict relation in two forms to prevent both actions being performed by a single individual: by
a global conflict relation when conflicting actions cannot be concurrently performed whatever be
the senders; and by a relativized conflict relation when conflicting actions cannot be performed by
the same individual. The global conflict relation is denoted by #g ⊆ AB × AB and follows as the
original relation for CL. The relation α#g β, α, β ∈ AB, denotes that actions α and β cannot
happen at the same time whatever be the senders. Similarly, the relativized conflict relation is
denoted by #r ⊆ AB ×AB. The relation α, β ∈ AB, α#r β denotes that the actions cannot occur
simultaneously when performed by the same individual. Thus in a relativized conflict relation if
the actions are performed by distinct individuals then a conflict does not occur.
We then proceed by redefining the conflict detection procedure described by Algorithm 2. An
evaluation on a state s ∈ S of the automaton A(C) considers the deontic information obtained by
the function δ(s). For every set of deontic labels D ∈ δ(s), a state s of A(C) has a conflict if there
exists an element d ∈ D which is in conflict to an element d′ of D′ ∈ δ(s)−D. The set of conflicting
Algorithm 2: Conflict detection in RCL
input : A state s of A(C)
output : A conflict
begin
for D ∈ δ(s) do
for D′ ∈ (δ(s) − {D}) do
if ∃d ∈ D | f#(d) ∩ D′ 6= ∅ then
return Conflict between d and f#(d) ∩ D′;
end
end
end
return no conflict detected;
end
deontic operators with respect to another operator is obtained by the function f# :M→ 2M [3].
Given a deontic operator d, f# returns operators that are in conflict to d. For each d ∈ D, the
algorithm searches for an element of D′ in the set of operators obtained by f#(d).
In our case study, the conflict detection process has found that the internal rule of the carrier
conflicts with the remaining contract as described at line (20) of Figure 5. This internal rule states
that the carrier only sends the product after the payment of the shipping costs. On the other hand,
in the original contract, one expects that the product will be delivered by the carrier to the buyer
before the payment of shipping costs is released by the bank. Therefore an incompatibility happens
on the internal rule of the carrier, where the payment of the seller related to shipping costs was
expected by the carrier before sending the product to the buyer. The conflict emerges due to the
internal rule of the carrier that waits the payment of shipping costs by the seller, instead of the
bank, to deliver the product.
The output analysis obtained by the practical tool (See Section 5) reveals such conflict as given
in Figure 8. At the at line (1) of Figure 8 we see the message declaring that a conflict was found
in the contract. Line (2) says in which state the conflict was found and Line (3) gives the precise
information about the conflict that was detected, i.e. an atomic and subcontract. We notice that
the first clause specifies that the carrier is forbidden to deliver the product to the buyer. At the
same time, in the second clause, it is required that the carrier is obligated to deliver the product
to the buyer. Clearly, both clauses cannot be simultaneously satisfied.
An automaton trace is shown at line (4) as a sequence of states and transitions that leads the
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1 [CONFLICT] A c o n f l i c t was found in the analyzed cont rac t .
2 C o n f l i c t found in s t a t e ( s24 )
3 C o n f l i c t : F( c , de l iverProduct , b) c o n f l i c t s with [O( c , de l iverProduct , b) ]
4 Trace : ( s24 )<−T19−(s23 )<−T17−(s22 )<−T13−(s21 )<−T12−(s20 )<−T11−(s0 )
Figure 8: The RECALL output analysis
contract to a conflicting state. For instance, the entire contract was processed and decomposed
at the initial state (s0). According to the action on transition (T11) the state (s20) is obtained.
Similarly, successive decompositions are held until reaching the conflicting state (s24). More details
are also provided by the tool such as decompositions associated to each state of the automaton and
actions that were performed over the transitions. Figure 9 shows the decomposition of the contract
at state s23 into state s24 by transition T19, when the seller sends the product to the carrier.
1 ( s24 ) − {s , c } [ ! payShippingCosts∗ ] ({ c , b}F( de l i ve rProduct ) /F/ ) AND
2 {c , b } [ d e l i ve rProduct ] ({ c , s } [ no t i f yProductDe l i ve ry ] (
3 {s , k } [ r e l e a s eSh ipp ingCos t s ] ({ k , c}O( payShippingCosts ) /F/ ) AND
4 {s , k}O( r e l e a s eSh ipp ingCos t s ) /F/ ) AND {b , k } [ not i fyProductRece ipt ]
5 ({k , c}O( payProduct ) /F/ ) AND {c , s}O( not i f yProductDe l ive ry ) /F/ AND
6 {b , k}O( not i fyProductRece ipt ) /F/ ) AND {c , b}O( de l i ve rProduct ) /F/
7 <T19> − [ ( s , sendProduct , c ) , ( s , payShippingCosts , k ) ]
8 ( s23 ) − {s , c } [ ! payShippingCosts∗ ] ({ c , b}F( de l i ve rProduct ) /F/ ) AND
9 {s , c } [ sendProduct ] ({ c , b } [ d e l i ve rProduct ] ({ c , s } [ no t i f yProductDe l ive ry ] (
10 {s , k } [ r e l e a s eSh ipp ingCos t s ] ({ k , c}O( payShippingCosts ) /F/ ) AND
11 {s , k}O( r e l e a s eSh ipp ingCos t s ) /F/ ) AND {b , k } [ not i fyProductRece ipt ]
12 ({k , c}O( payProduct ) /F/ ) AND {c , s}O( not i f yProductDe l ive ry ) /F/ AND
13 {b , k}O( not i fyProductRece ipt ) /F/ ) AND {c , b}O( de l i ve rProduct ) /F/ ) AND
14 {s , k}O( payShippingCosts ) /F/ AND {s , c}O( sendProduct ) /F/
Figure 9: A contract decomposition
5 RECALL Tool
The conflict detection method proposed in Section 4 has been implemented to allow automatic
analysis for multi-party contracts specified on RCL. The fundamental structures that composes
the RECALL tool is presented in Figure 10. The Command Line Interface module implements the
Figure 10: The RECALL architecture
interaction between the tool and users, where settings for a contract analysis need to be provided
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to the tool. The data information of a contract specified by the RCL syntax are stated by the
Contract Representation module. The Automaton Construction module constructs the automaton
that models the contract described in RCL. The Conflict Analysis module aims at finding conflicts
according to decompositions while the automaton is constructed.
5.1 Development
RECALL is mainly developed in Java [15], but it is supported by several libraries such as ANTLR [16],
which generates the grammar syntax, and Apache Commons CLI [22], which configures the user
interface file. Some mathematical operations of set theory that are used by Automaton Construc-
tion and Conflict Analysis modules were optimized by Guava [7] library. Further, the generated
automaton of the analysis can also be graphically yield due to the Graphviz [6] library.
The core method of the construction automaton is shown at Figure 11. We highlight some
important fragments of this method. At line (4) we see that the Conflict Analysis module is
invoked for every decomposition obtained by the automaton construction. It allows to stop the
verification process as soon as a conflict is found, avoiding unnecessary subsequent decompositions.
Nevertheless, the verification process may also continue up to the end of construction, when the
yielded automaton represents the whole contract. All possible conflicts can then be revealed as seen
at lines (7) to (9) of Figure 11. A contract is declared free of conflicts when all decompositions are
conflict-free. Otherwise, the contract is deemed in conflict and a counter-example is displayed by
the tool. Decompositions are successively obtained by the Decomposer class at line (10) according
1 void constructAutomaton ( State s ) {
2 Clause c1 = s . getClause ( ) ;
3 i f ( c1 . getValue ( ) == null ) {
4 i f ( s ea r che r . ha sCon f l i c t ( s ) )
5 automaton . setConf l i c tFound ( true ) ;
6 for ( Set<Relat iv i zedAct ion> a : generateAct ions ( c1 ) ) {
7 i f ( ( automaton . i sConf l i c tFound ( ) && ! c o n f i g . i sCont inueOnConf l i c t ( ) )
8 | | s . g e t S i t u a t i o n ( ) == Sta t eS i tua t i on . c o n f l i c t i n g )
9 return ;
10 Clause c2 = decomposer . decompose ( ( Clause ) c1 . c l one ( ) , a ) ;
11 State s1 = automaton . getStateByClause ( c2 ) ;
12 i f ( s1 != null ) {
13 automaton . g e tTran s i t i on s ( ) . add (new Trans i t i on ( s , s1 , a ) ) ;
14 } else {
15 s1 = new State ( c2 ) ;
16 automaton . g e tS ta t e s ( ) . add ( s1 ) ;
17 automaton . g e tTran s i t i on s ( ) . add (new Trans i t i on ( s , s1 , a ) ) ;
18 constructAutomaton ( s1 ) ;
19 s1 . getTrace ( ) . add (new Trans i t i on ( s , s1 , a ) ) ;
20 }
21 }
22 } else
23 s . s e t S i t u a t i o n (
24 c1 . getValue ( ) ? S ta t eS i tua t i on . s a t i s f a c t i o n : S t a t eS i tua t i on . v i o l a t i n g ) ;
25 }
Figure 11: The automaton construction method
to the decomposition function f (See Section 4). The decompose method receives as parameters
a clause that must be decomposed and a set of relativized actions and then returns a new clause
following the rules defined in RCL semantics. A new state is added to the automaton in order to
represent the decomposed clause.
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The conflict detection algorithm is invoked for every decomposition of the automaton construc-
tion. This algorithm is implemented by the method hasConflict and depicted at Figure 12. We
1 boolean hasCon f l i c t ( State s t a t e ) {
2 Clause c l au s e = s t a t e . getClause ( ) ;
3 Set<Set<DeonticTag>> de l t a = extractTags ( c l au s e ) ;
4 for ( Set<DeonticTag> d1 : de l t a )
5 for ( Set<DeonticTag> d2 : Sets . d i f f e r e n c e ( de l ta , Sets . newHashSet ( d1 ) ) )
6 for ( DeonticTag d : d1 ) {
7 Set<DeonticTag> c o n f l i c t S e t = g e n e r a t e C o n f l i c t S e t (d) ;
8 Set<DeonticTag> i n t e r = Sets . i n t e r s e c t i o n ( c o n f l i c t S e t , d2 ) ;
9 i f ( ! i n t e r . isEmpty ( ) ) {
10 s t a t e . s e t S i t u a t i o n ( S ta t eS i tua t i on .CONFLICTING) ;
11 s t a t e . s e t C o n f l i c t I n f o r m a t i o n (new Con f l i c t In f o rmat i on (d , in t e r , d2 ) ) ;
12 return true ;
13 }
14 }
15 s t a t e . s e t S i t u a t i o n ( S ta t eS i tua t i on .CONFLICTFREE) ;
16 return fa l se ;
17 }
Figure 12: The conflict detection method
see at line (3) that the extractTags method implements the deontic extractor function fd [4]. This
method receives a clause and returns sets of deontic tags according to the evaluation of the current
clause. Every element of these sets of deontic tags, e.g., di, is checked against each element of the
other sets, e.g., dj , to finding potential conflicts. Function f# returns any conflict between deontic
operators related to d, for all d ∈ di, and any d′ ∈ dj , for all dj 6= di, according to pre-defined
conflicts. A conflict is raised by the tool if at least one element of di is conflicting to an element
of dj . In this case hasConflict method, at line (10), adds a flag at the state that contains the
conflicting decompositions and stores the list of conflicting deontic tags, at line (11), to be returned
by the tool.
In the process of checking a multi-party contract, RECALL tool loads a text file with the
contract’s description in RCL. The set of individuals I and the set of actions AB are extracted to
calculate the set of relativized actions Ar and also the set of concurrent actions A2r. The sets of
concurrent relativized actions are then ordered according to number of actions. We firstly consider
the largest sets to be processed in the process. The ordering strategy potentially increases the
possibility of finding conflicts as soon as possible once a conflict becomes more likely to happen the
bigger the number of concurrent actions.
The combinatorial computing of relativized actions grows exponentially as the number of actions
and individuals also grows. But we notice that many of these combinatorial computation need not
to be calculated since their representations do not reflect sceneries of the contract under test. States
and transitions of the automaton are constructed unnecessarily when theses sceneries are considered
on the analysis. To illustrate this problem one considers the contract with |I| = 4 and |AB| = 3.
Hence the set of relativized actions |Ar| = 48 and the set of concurrent actions |A2r| = 248 − 1.
We easily see that not only the ordering strategy over actions is important but also it is needed to
overcome the combinatorial explosion problem. In any case we make clear that the nature of the
problem remains combinatorial. We discuss aspects related to processing time and scalability in
Section 6.
We also apply a pruning strategy over the set of relativized actions when precessing clauses. We
select on-the-fly only relativized actions related to the current decomposition on the process. Note
that only actions of a current subcontract must be considered in the computation from that point
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onwards for corresponding decompositions. Irrelevant actions with respect to the current clause
in a decomposition are then discarded in subsequent evaluations. Decompositions over dynamic
modalities need to take into account only trigger actions. Thus only one particular state among
those possible decompositions need to be computed, and the remaining clause is discarded in the
current computation. Penalties of deontic modalities are also discarded in an evaluation since they
take effect only when the obligation (or prohibition) is violated.
5.2 Tool Practical Application
RECALL2 has been conceived to analyze multi-party contracts specified in RCL. A multi-party
contract must be described in a text file according to the RCL syntax. Then the specification is
submitted to the tool which, in turn, analyses the contract.
The specification file is arranged in two parts: pre-defined conflicts and clauses. Figure 13
presents a simple example of a contract specification file. See that the pre-defined conflicts are
conflict {
global { (a, b), (c, d) };
relativized { (e, f), (e, a) };
};
[e]({j,k}O(f) ^ P(a) ^ {k}[a.b]({i,j}O(e&f)));
{j,i}F(c) _/{j}O(d)/_ ^ P(b) ^ {i,k}[a]({k}[b]({j,i}P(h))));
Figure 13: A simple example of a contract in RCL.
described in the header of the file and it is optional once a contract may not have pre-defined
conflicts. We note that global conflicts are given pairwise within the tag global, and relativized
conflicts are defined pairwise within the tag relativized. Clauses of the contract are specified in
sequel following the RCL grammar.
Relativization on deontic operators can be defined as follows:
1. relativized, when there is only one individual between braces, e.g. {i}O(a), where individual
i is obliged to perform action a.
2. directed, when there are two individuals related to the modality, e.g. {i,j}O(a), where
individual i is obliged to perform action a to individual j.
3. global, if the information is omitted, e.g. O(a), where all individuals of the contract are
obliged to perform action a.
Similarly we have relativizations over dynamic operators. Deontic modalities are represented by
O, P, e F, respectively, obligation, permission and prohibition operators. Penalties are described
between / and / after the associated clause.
Once the contract has been specified we submit it to RECALL by setting the parameters of
analysis. Table 3 lists the running parameters of the tool. After running the tool, the resulting
2More information and the source code is available on http://recallcontracts.github.io
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Parameter Description
−c the automaton is completely constructed and all conflicts can be
found
−g the resulting automaton is exported to a DOT file
−n one considers all possible combinations of actions
−v the resulting analysis is displayed in verbose mode
−h the running options and some examples are displayed
Table 3: Running parameters of RECALL tool
analysis says whether the contract under test is conflict-free. We obtain the output verdict by means
of conflict detection traces (See Figure 8) and also by a graphical representation of the constructed
automaton.
5.3 Providing a Conflict-free Sales Contract
The result of the verification analysis allows us to solve the raised conflict changing some deals in
the original contract. We first include a new clause where the bank now must notify the carrier
with respect to the payment of the shipping costs performed by the seller. Another amendment in
the contract has been done specifically in the internal rule of the carrier. Now the carrier takes into
account the bank notification as a guarantee of payment for shipping costs.
We then rewrite the contract specification following the proposed changes in order to avoid the
conflict situation. We change clauses (5) and (12) of the contract’s description as follows:
[General Contract]
5. Bank must notify the Carrier about the payment with respect to the shipping costs and after Bank attests
the payment, the Carrier is obliged to deliver the product to the Buyer.
[Carrier Rules]
12. Carrier is prohibited to deliver the product till Bank has notified the Carrier that Seller has paid the shipping
costs.
* Note that the remaining clauses of the original contract is kept unchanged.
The amendments of the new contract are presented in Figure 14. The specific clause where the
bank notifies the carrier with respect to the shipping costs is described at line (2), which represents
line (9) in the original contract. The carrier considers the bank notification as guarantee to release
the product delivery at line (4) in the new version corresponding to line (21) in the original contract.
Lines (1)-(8) and (10)-(20) of the original contract remain unchanged.
On the next step we resubmit the new version of sales contract to RECALL tool. This time the
resulting analysis has declared that the sales contract is conflict-free. After these adjustments once
the bank is now obliged to notify the carrier about the payment of the shipping costs we guarantee
that the contract runs to completion safely without no loss to any party. We remark that no other
conflict has been detected in the contract.
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1 . . .
2 (09) {k , c}O( noti fyShippingPayment ) ˆ {s , c } [ sendProduct ] (
3 . . .
4 (21) {k , c } [ ( ! noti fyShippingPayment )∗ ] ({ c , b}F( de l i ve rProduct ) ) ;
Figure 14: The amended version of the sales contract
For the sack of completeness we note that even the latest version of the sales contract cannot be
captured by a set of bilateral contracts due to similar arguments that have been given beforehand
over the oldest version.
6 Practical Experiments
We performed some experiments in order to verify the efficiency of our method and the tool scala-
bility. The experiments are classified according to the number of actions and individuals modeled
in the contract specifications. We basically explore two main aspects on each group: execution time
and memory consumption. We separated the experiments into three groups, each group described
in a corresponding subsection in the sequel. In the first group we studied how the number of actions
impacts in the verification process; in the second group the number of individuals in the contracts
were varied; and in the third we consider a high number of actions and individuals, simultaneously,
in order to stress the tool up to its limit.
All experiments were performed using randomly generated contract specifications which were
checked on a Core2duo running Linux with 8Gb of RAM memory. For each variation of a specific
parameter, a total of 100 contract specifications were generated and checked. We chose randomized
experiments in order to avoid biases when treating each set of experiments.
6.1 Varying the Number of Actions
In this first group of experiments we varied the number of actions for each contract specification,
with fixed number of individuals. The number of actions ranged from 8 to 15 and the number
of individuals was fixed at 8. The execution time and the memory consumption is given by the
average of 100 generated contracts for each class. For instance, the processing time takes at most 1.5
minutes for contracts with 8 individuals and 11 actions for 100 contract specifications, on average.
Figure 15 shows how the execution time of the verification process varied according to the
number of actions in the contracts. We remark that some contract verifications have not finished
with a verdict due to the explosion problem, specially for contracts with a higher number of actions.
The execution time average is calculated based on the whole group of 100 contracts, seeing that
for those unfinished experiments the resource consumption was much higher than the experiments
with a verdict. For each class of contracts with 8 up to 15 actions, we obtained 2, 2, 3, 6, 5, 5, 2,
and 13 unfinished checking processes of 100 performed experiments. We observe that the execution
time, on average, does not take more than 2.5 minutes, in general, even for contracts with a high
number of actions.
Similarly, we can observe the memory consumption for the same scenario in Figure 16. We note
that the memory consumption, on average, does not take more than around 1.4 Gb, in general. We
also see that for the class of contracts with 8 individuals and 15 actions the memory consumption
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Figure 15: Varying the number of actions: execution time
grows drastically compared to previous classes. We remark again that those unfinished checking
processes are being calculated on the memory consumption average.
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Figure 16: Varying the number of actions: memory consumption
6.2 Varying the Number of Individuals
In this group of experiments we varied the number of individuals in the contract specifications,
with fixed number of actions. We ranged the number of individuals from 5 to 12 and the number
of actions remained fixed at 10.
We show in Figure 17 how the execution time of the verification process varied according to
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the number of individuals in the contracts. Again, we remark that the execution time and memory
average is calculated based on 100 contract specifications. In this scenario we notice that all
experiments in groups with 5, and 6 individuals have finished with a verdict. Groups with 7 and 8
individuals had one unfinished checking process, while groups with 9, 10, 11, and 12 individuals had
6, 6, 16, and 20, respectively, unfinished processes. We observe that the execution time, on average,
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Figure 17: Varying the number of individuals: execution time
does not take more than 5 minutes, but we note that the execution time substantially grows from
11 individuals onwards.
In Figure 18 we observe the memory consumption for the same scenario. Similarly to the execu-
tion time the memory consumption drastically grows from experiments with 11 individuals onwards,
more precisely, from 1 Gb to 3 Gb approximately. But, in general, the memory consumption does
not take more than 3 Gb at maximum.
6.3 Stress testing
In the last set of experiments we have run contract specifications to stress the tool. We generated
four groups of 100 contracts, but in this case we discarded unfinished checking runs.
In the first group we performed experiments where the contracts have a fixed number of 8
individuals and a fixed number of 15 actions. The execution time on checking each contract is
shown in Figure 19. Here we have 13 contracts that do not run to completion. In contrast, we
obtain 87 contract runs with a verdict, and most of them takes less than 30 seconds to be checked.
We also observe the memory consumption for the same scenario in Figure 20, and only 9 experiments
from 87 finished runs take more than 1 Gb of RAM memory.
Next we increase the number of actions from 15 to 20, while the number of individuals remains
fixed at 8. We show in Figure 21 the execution time. We have 25 unfinished checking runs due to
the memory overflow whereas 75 contracts have finished the process with a verdict, and only 10 %
(8 runs of 75 in total) has taken more than 3 minutes to be checked.
We also observe that the memory consumption did not grow too much if compared to previous
group, as seen in Figure 22. Most of the experiments takes up to 2 Gb of memory at maximum,
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Figure 18: Varying the number of individuals: memory consumption
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Figure 19: Contracts with 8 individuals and 15 actions: execution time
and only 16% of the experiments (12 runs of 75 in total) have consumed between 2Gb and 7Gb of
RAM memory.
In the third group we performed experiments where the contracts have a fixed number of 15
individuals and a fixed number of 10 actions. That is, we increase the number of individuals,
compared to the previous group, from 8 to 15, but we reduce the number of actions from 15 to 10
in total. Figure 23 shows the execution time on checking each contract. We reach 36 unfinished
checking runs and 64 experiments that run to completion. We note that only 6% (4 of 64 in total)
of those finished experiments take more than 5 minutes, and up to 17 minutes to be checked.
By completeness Figure 24 presents the memory consumption for the same scenario. Most
experiments also takes up to 2 Gb of memory at maximum, and only around 15% of the experiments
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Figure 20: Contracts with 8 individuals and 15 actions: memory consumption
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Figure 21: Contracts with 8 individuals and 20 actions: execution time
(10 runs of 64 in total) have consumed between 2Gb and 8Gb of RAM memory.
The resource consumption increases as the number of actions and individuals grows in the
experiment. But also notice that the number of individuals has a more pronounced impact than
the number of actions in the contracts.
In the last group we performed experiments where the contracts have a fixed number of 18
individuals and a fixed number of 10 actions. That is, we increase the number of individuals,
compared to the second group, from 8 to 18, and reduce the number of actions from 20 to 10.
Figure 25 shows the execution time. In this case we obtained at the rate of 81% of unfinished
checking runs while only 19 experiments have run to completion with the execution time up to 15
minutes.
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Figure 22: Contracts with 8 individuals and 20 actions: memory consumption
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Figure 23: Contracts with 15 individuals and 10 actions: execution time
Regarding the memory consumption we see in the Figure 26 that only 5 contracts were checked
with less than 2Gb of RAM memory, and the remaining takes between 2Gb and 8Gb of RAM
memory.
We noticed a more prominently resource consumption when the number of individuals grows in
the experiment. In this last scenario, with 18 individuals and 10 actions, we observe higher ratios of
execution time and memory consumption when the number of individuals and actions are inversely
proportional compared to the second group where the contracts have 8 individuals and 20 actions.
The result reinforces the effect regarding the growth of individuals more than the number of actions
in the contract specifications.
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Figure 24: Contracts with 15 individuals and 10 actions: memory consumption
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Figure 25: Contracts with 18 individuals and 10 actions: execution time
6.4 Threats to Validity
All contract specifications were randomly generated in our experiments. Even though the generation
procedure is unbiased, we cannot able to make claims about the similarity between these generated
contract specifications and real contracts which may appear in practice. To overcome this threat, in
future works, more experiments could be replicated using real contract specifications as made with
the sales contract. Another threat is related to the algorithm that randomly generate the contract
specifications. It may somehow bring forth rarer and special cases where the RECALL tool does
not deal with very well, e.g. which logical operators have been randomly chosen within the clauses.
We tackled this threat by using a high number of contracts for each group of experiments, reducing
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Figure 26: Contracts with 18 individuals and 10 actions: memory consumption
the influence of this factor on the results.
7 Conclusion
This work proposed a method for checking multi-party contracts that can be formally modeled by an
extended contract language. We defined the syntax and the semantics for t The extended contract
language, named RCL, was defined to enclose relativizations in the classical contract language. We
developed the proposal to automatically check multi-party contracts specified by RCL.
A real-world contract, characterized by multi-party aspects, was also specified and submitted
to our tool as a case study of an electronic commerce problem. The tool was able to detect
an important problem in the original specification rising a conflicting relationship between their
participating parties. We could fix the contract specification by means the resulting analysis and
in a new checking run with our tool declared a conflict-free verdict over the reviewed version for
the sales contract.
We also performed practical experiments for different scenarios in order to evaluate the RECALL
tool. We assay aspects related to scalability and efficiency of our tool, exploring complementary
parameters, i.e. number of actions and number of individuals that are restrained on the contract.
The experimental results indicated a good performance when we have a balance between the number
of individuals and the number of actions summed up of around 20. The analyses also revealed that
the number of individuals has greater influence than the number of actions on this efficiency.
We leave for future work a graphical user interface to ease the contract modeling and the process
of analysis. We also expect to inspire other works to improve the algorithms proposed in this work.
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